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THE CHALLENGES OF THE YEAR 2000 AND BEYOND FOR
CENTRAL BANKS
By

Dr. E. A. Ajayi*
L

INTRODUCTION
In just four months time, the year 2000 will roll in and the world will be witnessing

the beginning of another millennium, the 21st century. Different organisations and
professions have been organising seminars aimed at appraising their achievements or
otherwise as well as their roles and relevance in the new millennium. The timing of this
seminar is therefore appropriate and its theme "Central Banking in the Year 2000 and
Beyond: Challenges for the Central Bank of Nigeria" is germane to stimulating discussions
focused on the evolution and prospects of central banking as well as familiarising seminar
participants not only with contemporary policy issues but also with challenges they may
have to grapple with as central banking transits into the 21st century.
My task is to highlight the challenges which may confront central banks in the
discharge of their inter-dependent responsibilities as they go into the next millennium and
the 21st century rolls along. Section II provides a bird's eye-view of the evolution of
central banks because as Professor Charles Goodhart puts it, "a deep understanding of
history helps to obtain a good insight into future problems no matter in what guise they
may emerge." 1 Sections ill and VII examine the challenges likely to face central banks in
sustaining monetary policy and price stability, the stability of the financial system,
exchange rate stability, management of central banks operations and the often referred to
' millennium bug', taking cognizance of the fact t9at "the essence of Central Bank's
thinking ... is looking through time, through the medium-term into the long-term." 2 The
paper is concluded in Section V.
II.

EVOLUTION OF CENTRAL BANKS

Central banks have grown in number from 18 in 1900 to 23 in 1920, 80 in 1960 and
161 in 1990 and the number has continued to increase as more countries gained political
independence. Throughout their history, central banks, especially the earlier established
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ones, performed different tasks at different periods and although their developments were
not identical, yet in the words of Alexandre Larnfalusi, "in a long and broad historical
perspective, central banking has always been in transition ... just like most of the
institutions in modem time."3
The earlier ones were established as special commercial banks with government
charters, which made them the main bankers to their respective governments and were
granted the sole privilege of issuing currency. In some countries such as Sweden, Norway,
Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands, where monopoly rights were not necessary, the
government chartered banks were effectively the only commercial banks in existence at the
time of establishment. The reasons for establishing these banks included the provision of
commercial banking services where there was none. The investment of the bank's capital
in government bonds was the chief motivating factor for the governments, while the
existence of state debt holders expected to deepen the market for such debt was a succour
for the chartered banks. For those established immediately after the Napoleonic Wars,
restoration of monetary stability in the wake of what in Denmark was aptly termed
"Statsbankerot" (State bankruptcy) attendant to the excessive issue of government paper
currency to meet war time expenditure, was the main motive.4
By 1913, a common standard role for central banks had evolved; and all the elements
in Walter Bagehot's 1873 proposal that the central bank should not be concerned with
short-term profit maximisation but should "attempt, in the long-term interests of the
financial system as a whole, to prevent contagious panic and to maintain systematic
stability,"5 appeared to have been put into practice. The main objective of the central bank
was to maintain the value of its currency through convertibility into gold. The main control
instrument was variation in interest rates. The interest rates were made effective by
discounting bills and increasingly by open market operations. It had withdrawn from
business competition and rivalry with commercial banks to become the bankers' bank
while the banks had accepted its leadership role. It had served as lender of last resort and,
on occasions, engaged in rescue operations for financial institutions as in the AustriaHungary stock market crash of 1873, the 1882 stock market crash in France and Portugal's
banking crisis of 1876. Also, there were cases of central bank cooperation as evidenced in
gold lending among themselves to help stabilize interest rates, and in the Banque de France
discounting bills for the Bank of England as early as 1839.6
The main central bank functions now include issuing legal tender currency and
safeguarding its value; promoting monetary or price stability; serving as banker to the
government ad the banks; as well as ensuring the soundness of the financial system. In
carrying out these interrelated tasks, central banks operating in an internationally
integrated, innovative, highly competitive global environment, and in an extremely fast
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process of change, have acquired enhanced importance and status hardly envisaged by
their founding fathers. The novelty does not lie only in the pace of change but also with the
fact that change is occurring everywhere with no perceptible end in sight.

ID. MACROECONOMIC CHALLENGES

ID.I Monetary Policy and Price Stability
As earlier noted, the first generation central banks established either to provide an
additional source of fund for government or to assist in the restoration of monetary
stability, while the investment of their capital in fixed-interest government stock provided
them an incentive to seek price stability. Thus, very early in the history of central banking,
inflation as a monetary phenomenon was appreciated and the role of central banks in the
maintenance of price stability was recognized. Hence, the truth in the assertion by Alan
Greenspan that the "guiding principle that runs throughout the history of central banking
is that the fundamental strategic policy of a monetary authority should be a macroeconomic price stability"7 and that central banks should be seen as the guardians of price
stability.
Monetary policy aimed at price stability bas passed through a number of phases in
line with the evolution of central banking. The goal was the maintenance of the value of
the currency or price stability in terms of gold in the early days of central banking and in
terms of goods in modem times. Price stability as the focus of monetary policy hardly
mattered when money was tied to gold, there could be no inflation in such a system except
on rate occasions of substantial new gold discoveries. With the demise of the gold standard,
the insignificant status of monetary policy after the Great Depression, the rise of
discretionary monetary policy to bring inflation under control, and the greater appreciation
of the dangers of high and variable inflation, there emerged a consensus in the 1970s
among academics, the public and central bankers that price stability should be "treasured
and enshrined as the prime monetary policy priority."8
This largely accounted for the decision of one country after another that the Central
Bank's monetary policy goal should be price stability and that active policy was needed to
achieve that objective.9 To this end, Germany and the United States adopted monetary
targeting in 1974, Switzerland did so in 1975 while the United l(jngdom and France among
others, did so in 1976 and 1977 respectively. This still appears to be in vogue and is likely
to be carried over into the 21st century.
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However, financial innovation is now feared to be introducing elements of uncertainty
either in the monetary authorities' decision-making process or in the transmission
mechanism, i.e., the way in which a monetary policy decisions affects prices and the real
economy. The potential influence of complicated devices such as swaps, interest rate
futures or options, is still largely terra incognito, studies on which are a major challenge
for central banks, and that challenge will be a carry-over to the 21st century. Also in the
view of Yusushi Mieno, one time Governor of the Bank of Japan, a challenge to the
strategy of money supply targeting is the incidence, since the 1980s of asset price bubbles
along with general price instability. While monetary policy should not be aimed at asset
price stability, "yet we cannot ignore asset prices, given that any large fluctuation can have
a serious adverse impact on financial system ... The question still remains as to how we
should treat asset prices in formulating policy" 10
Are these developments sufficiently overwhelming to doubt the "efficacy" of a
money supply based monetary policy? If so, should it be discarded or used in diminishing
scale along with the discretionary strategy which it sought to replace? What happens to its
known advantages which included providing enough advance warning of inflation dangers
for timely action to be taken? Tracking the ultimate goal of price stability alone raises the
danger that the central bank will not be able to anticipate trouble. By clearly defining the
stance of monetary policy, money supply targeting helps the formation of expectations by
market participants, relieves central banks of pressure from government quarters and helps
to avoid the temptation of judgemental adjustments to monetary policy. Most importantly,
a money supply target which is relatively well understood by the people at large, gives a
clear signal to market participants as to the range of price adjustments and wage
settlements that is compatible with a stability oriented monetary policy. Beyond this range,
they run the risk of pricing themselves out of the market.
If money supply targeting were discarded, all the listed advantages would be lost to
monetary policy formulation unless a more efficient mechanism is found to replace it. This
is a future challenge to central bankers to be properly addressed in the course of unfolding
developments. If it means a return to the judgemental type of monetary policy which
preceded it, the conduct of monetary policy could become more difficult. It would mean
carrying out a judgemental type of monetary policy in a new set of circumstances, in which
central banks are entrusted with the explicit mandate to secure price stability and have no
excuse for failure, because as "independent" central banks, they do not have to comply
with the whims of their political masters. In the event of failure, they stand to once again
face the wrath of the "Free Banking School" that do not believe in the need for central
banks. Again, the challenge here in essence is, to the extent that the setting of a monetary
supply target no longer provides an unambiguous indicator of the resolve of central banks
to pursue a stability-oriented monetary policy, in which case, central banks will have to
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find other ways and means of conveying their messages to the markets. This will
necessarily entail better and more detailed information on the economic analyses forming
the basis for monetary policy. And these they will need to do in a way to maintain and
enhance their credibility.
Monetary policy does not operate in a vacuum. In particular, what happens in the
fiscal area does matter a lot. A fiscal 'stance not supportive of monetary policy is likely to
trigger inflationary pressures. Hence, the need for an appropriate policy mix. An optimum
policy mix in which monetary and fiscal policy stances as complementary and mutually
supportive requires two correct decisions not simply one. This is a major challenge to
central banks now and may continue to be so for quite some time into the 21st century.
A democratic society has an inflationary bias. This carries with it a challenge for
central banks to ensure the general public's understanding of price stability in all its
ramifications and gain their firm support for it. Jacques de Larosiere puts this very aptly
when he stated that "it is the public at large and the markets that will need to support the
continuation of anti-inflationary policies. This is all the more important to communicating
clearly the right message. Say what you do, and do what you say." 11 This is a challenge to
the credibility of central banks. On this, I will end this section with the words of Karl-Otto
Pohl, a one time President of the German Bundesbank: "In Germany, we have always been
in a very happy situation because the people like the Bundesbank much more than the
Government or any other institution in their country." He proceeded to add that this was
confirmed by Jacques Delors who also observed that "not all Germans believe in God but
all Germans believe in the Bundesbank." 12 This state of affairs is not reached overnight. It
is the result of persistently consistent and successful execution of monetary policy aimed
at price stability which in tum made the Bundesbank credible and helped build and sustain
a low inflation consistency over the years. Very few central banks can boast of this and it
remains one of the challenges they will carry over to the 21st century.

IV. STABILITY OF THE FINANCIAL AND PAYMENT SYSTEM
Because the financial system is the nerve centre of the economic system, its stability
is regarded as a traditional task of central banks. Indeed, more often than not, they were
entrusted with this at the same time as that of issuing bank notes. Even today, in cases
where the macro-prudential function has been carved out to other agencies, central banks
are still viewed as responsible, or at least co-responsible for ensuring the stability of the
financial and payment system as a whole.
The history of financial institutions shows an often unsatisfactory mixture: innovation
in response to the needs of growing economies, but many disruptive episodes of financial
instability. Failures and fraud in their financial system have led governments in both
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developed and developing countries to intervene extensively either in support of failing
institutions or to channel cheap credit to sectors perceived to be at the forefront of
development. I 3 However, the developed countries while intervening did not forget to put
emphasis on measures designed to safeguard the stability of the financial system and did
not hesitate to embark on deregulation and liberalization as from the 1970s when the
economic and financial fundamentals pointed in that direction. The developing countries
on the other hand delayed deregulation because they failed to realize early enough that
even a well designed control regime tends to lose effectiveness if maintained for too long
and the potential for mistakes grows as economies become more complex. Neither did they
pay due attention to regulatory and prudential matters. In the event, financial institutions
weakened, at times when large fiscal and balance of payments deficits, inappropriate
interest and exchange rate regimes, high external debt, inflationary pressures,
fundamentally inefficient domestic industries, poor accounting standards and poor legal
framework, prevailed. All these, combined, led to distress in the system 14 and the incidence
of failed financial institutions which came close to that of the 1930s. Countries affected
included both developed and developing countries such as Argentina, Chile, Bolivia,
Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Guinea, Nigeria, the USA, Germany, Greece, Turkey and Norway. 15
Added to these were the 1997 Asia crisis engulfing Thailand, Indonesia and Korea as well
as the distress in the Japanese financial system. These crises were rooted mainly, in the
fragility of the financial sector stemming in part, from the weaknesses in the corporate,
financial and government sectors which, given the increasing rapidity with which
international capital movements often change course, made these economies increasingly
vulnerable to changes in market sentiment, deteriorating external situation and
contagion. 16
The important lesson to be drawn from these developments is that under any financial
system, mistakes can occur. Market-based financial systems, like public ones, are subject
to fraud and instability. The goal then, is not perfection but a system which mobilizes
resources efficiently, minimizes allocative mistakes, curbs fraud, and stops instability from
turning into a crisis. Restructuring a financial system with this in mind, is both a challenge
and an opportunity, but should not be a once for all affair.17 It has to be carried out in the
context of unfolding developments with the objective of having stability at all time.
Another challenge is that as at now the prevailing and prospective financial
environment will not make the achievement of this objective an easy task for a number of
reasons. First, is the globalization of financial markets which embraces international
financial integration and the blurring of demarcation lines between financial products as
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well as between different segments of the financial industry and the progress in
information and communication technology with the capability of transmitting with
lightning speed "impulses originating in one country or in one market segment to other
countries or the rest of the industry." 18 Second, financial asset prices have been displaying
a high degree of volatility unconnected with underlying fundamentals and cannot be
attributed to public policy blunders but which may be accentuated by globalization. Third,
is the increased opaqueness of financial markets which made more difficult the assessment
of creditworthiness of individual market participants on the basis of publicly available
information. This non-transparency blurs information flows and impedes the smooth
functioning of free markets. It has also become exceedingly difficult, if not impossible to
evaluate the interconnection between market segments either geographically or
functionally.
Fourth, central banks now face the dual challenge of the relative decline in the role of
banks in the financial system and the fading specificity of banking itself. About three or
four decades ago, commercial banks were the privileged market interlocutors of central
banks and by safeguarding the stability of the banking system, central banks were
reasonably sure that they were protecting, indirectly but effectively, the stabi lity of the
financial system as a whole. Now, this can be true to only diminishing extent. In the event,
regulators are under pressure to regularly reassess which institutions and functions they
should regulate and supervise and; bank regulation which thus far has evolved as an
accretion of ad hoc responses to particular crisis cannot satisfactorily meet the growing
flux of structural changes we are now witnessing. Fifth, there has been a spectacular surge
in the volume and average size of financial transactions, resulting in an unprecedented rise
in the volume of payments, intra-day settlement exposures, and with them liquidity and
credit risk have reached a new dimension putting a premium on the efficiency and
soundness of clearing and settlement arrangements.
Despite the instability inherent in the present globalised financial system and what it
portends for the future, it does contain built-in shock absorbers. Financial innovation has
put at the disposal of market participants hedging devices which offers protection against
asset price instability. Globalization itself has increased the depth and liquidity of markets,
while securitization led to a wider distribution of risks throughout the system, and market
efficiency has increased. The point however, is that the event of a local financial crisis
could easily and rapidly assume global dimensions. Central bankers cannot but be
conscious of this at all time now and right into the 21st century.
The message which all these send to central bank are threefold. First, monetary policy
should be directed in the medium-term towards the attainment of price stability. Lack of
credible commitment to that objective could aggravate the risk of market reaction and of
systematic instability. This may not eliminate all misalignments nor significantly reduce

44

CBN ECONOMIC & FINANCI AL REVLEW

VOL. 37 No. 4

short-term volatility, but it would at least eliminate monetary policy as a contributory
factor. Second, central banks would have to do everything in their power to make the
financial system more transparent through more complete and comparable disclosure by all
market participants. The cooperation between regulatory agencies with the accounting
profession and market participants will need to be fostered. Statistical information on
market links will need to be developed and perfected, even if this turns out to be a tedious
and costly exercise. Third, central banks should help enhance the safety of domestic and
international payment, settlement and clearing systems, which are the transmission
mechanisms that could amplify crisis manifestations and tum a local or sectoral crisis into
a genuinely global one. This leads me to the integrity and efficiency of the payments
system.
The link between economic activity and money occurs via the clearing and settlement
process and has a fundamental role in the execution of central bank monetary policy.
Accordingly, central banks will continue to have a special concern about clearing and
payments systems for broad reasons of policy. Also, the central bank's concern for stability
of the financial system cannot be divorced from its interest in the integrity of the payments
systems, i.e. the ability of the payments system to function safely even during times of
financial distress. Coupled with its integrity is the efficiency of the payments system,
because proper handling of payments is a resource consuming activity, deserving attention
on purely economic grounds.
The functioning of the payments systems also has implications for the efficiency of
the underlying markets. Some of the e markets, such as those for certain financial
instruments, are worldwide. The location of the nucleus of activity for these markets
depends partly on the integrity and efficiency of the clearing and settlement process in
different countries. Thus, central banks that want their countries to play a role as financial
centres must be concerned about the efficient operation of their payment systems. Finally,
in an interdependent world where goods, services and financial instruments are traded
routinely across national borders, there is need for cross-border settlement arrangements.
Such cross-border systems may operate in many countries and time zones, thus presenting
central banks with a variety of challenges that can only be met through the development
and execution of appropriate payment policies. 19

V.

EXCHANGE RATE STABILITY

As in other areas, exchange rate regime operated by central banks has evolved in a
cyclical fashion. In a reaction to the rigidity of the gold standard, which prevailed until
1914, floating rates were seen as the panacea to the economic problems of the inter-war
period. With "ensuring wave of exchange rate depreciation and beggar-my-neighbour
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policies generally, the consensus returned to exchange rate parity. In the 1960s floating
rates again became fashionable ... "20 and were generalized in 1973. The generalized
floating was itself a reaction to the Bretton Woods par value system which provided for
easily monitorable exchange rate adjustments. Since then, some countries have gone back
to exchange rate system fixed either to a major currency, the SDR basket or no rate within
a monetary block with the block floating against non-block currencies as in the European
Union. Whichever exchange rate regime a country decides upon, the challenge it poses to
the central bank is that of stability.
Exchange rate stability should not be construed as rigid or unchanging exchange rates
despite changing underlying fundamentals. Reasonable exchange rate stability is essential
for a variety of reasons, including a better functioning of the foreign exchange markets
devoid of the erratic and wild fluctuations of the type that characterized most of recent
years. Excessive rate movements also tend to lead to market abuses which in tum can lead
to losses in exchange markets even among the soundest of banks, thus aggravating strains
in the banking system. The inflationary consequences of excessive rate swings are also
worth bearing in mind.
The exchange rate regime adopted by a country is that of government decision, no
doubt with central bank input. The management of exchange rates however, is more often
than not, that of central banks. The pursuit of price stability through monetary policy can
be helped or hindered by exchange rate developments. It is apt to note here that the
orthodox monetary view that freely floating exchange rates would secure for individual
countries freedom to pursue their domestic policy objectives, particularly, that of price
stability, has not been vindicated in practice. First, according to Larnfalusi, the assumption
that monetary policy directed towards domestic monetary stability will also stabilize the
exchange rate is not always valid. While diverging stances of monetary and exchange rate
policies have a destabilizing effect on exchange rates, stability-oriented monetary policy
by itself may not carry with it exchange rate stability. Fiscal policy stance is also an
important and crucial element, either because of its possible influence on inflation
expectations, or by creating current account imbalances and therefore a shift in financial
portfolios. It may be true that monetary policy will always be able to offset the undesirable
impact of fiscal policy on exchange rates, but this will be at a cost, i.e. by resorting to
changes in interest rates which could not be justified in terms of domestic balance.
Secondly, exchange rate changes, whatever their origin, will affect domestic prices and will
therefore, have an impact on price expectations.2 1
The practical conclusion is two-fold. First, in their quest for price stability central
banks cannot disregard exchange rate developments. Neither are they able to influence
exchange rates, in the case of persistent fiscal imbalances, solely through monetary policy
means, or through exchange market interventions without running the risk of deviating
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from the pursuit of their domestic policy objective. Here again, the need for an appropriate
policy mix is important. However, the problem is compounded by the fact that in a world
of rigid fiscal policies, international agreement on a correct configuration of policy mixes
is even harder to come by than agreement on the appropriate monetary policy. The problem
will not end with the 20th century. central banks, to the extent that the largely prevailing
system persists, will continue to live with it in the next century.
Second, is the international dimension with its implications for the use of money
supply targeting. On the level of definition, there is the question of whether or not to
include in the targeted M, such items as non-residents' holdings of assets denominated in
domestic currency or residents' holdings of foreign currency assets. There is also the
related question of how to deal with assets held in offshore centres. More fundamentally,
the combinations of changes in interest rates differentials with shifting exchange rate
expectations may induce portfolio movements which may significantly destabilize the
behaviour of the targeted M. Finally, the increasingly large scale use of derivatives
certainly has an impact on treasury and liquidity management of corporations and is
therefore likely to have an impact on the behaviour of M . Again, these will not just fade
away with the 20th century. A major 21st century challenge to central banks is the possible
emergence of currency blocks as witnessed by the process of monetary integration in the
European Union resulting in the establishment of the European Central Bank and the
launching of Euro-currency for the participating eleven countries of the Union. With the
replacement of the national currencies with the Euro by or before 2002, there will be no
exchange rates in the complete EMU. Should the European experience be replicated in
other regions of the world, a not impossible situation given the economic and trade
arrangements gathering momentum as did the European Economic Community, may not
be ruled out and the 21st century may witness a world of big monetary blocks. The
question is, what will be the status of central banks in such monetary blocks?

VI. OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES
Historically, central banks were faced with various challenges in the course of
performing their functions. A number of these challenges are still there and will be carried
over to the 21st century. Some of the challenges have been noted earlier in the paper. The
management of a central bank does pose some challenges, a few of which have also been
alluded to.
First are the challenges of monetary policy formulation and implementation. The core
objective of a central bank is the maintenance of price stability. Its success in achieving this
hinges largely on the extent to which it is insulated in its operational decision-making from
transient political pressures motivated by government's proneness to politically expedient
policies. Although the paper is not on autonomy, it is apt to say that it would be inconsistent
to give the central bank a task and deny it the freedom of action to perform the task, a
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situation that prevailed until they recently in most countries. Even when granted the
freedom of action, there is still the challenge of ensuring compatibility of fiscal stance with
that of price stability-oriented monetary policy. In the event a central bank should develop
and sustain the art of marrying flexibility with firmness and as O' Grady Walsh puts it, "a
central bank should know when to bend with the wind and when to stand ground ...
recognize the legitimacy of government's primary concern with growth, employment, and
perhaps resource transfers, but be insistent on the perils of 'short-termism,' and on the
long-run benefits of monetary stability."22
To put it starkly, whatever the formal independence of a central bank is, what matters
is ensuring a good co-ordination of policies that will result in an appropriate policy mix for
the attainment or maintenance of price stability. The challenge here is what a central bank
should bring to that mix, and this is emphasis on the crucial importance of stability in the
specific sense of price stability and in the more general sense of the orderly performance
and continuity of financial markets.
As regards, its autonomy, a central bank has to work hard on daily basis to earn it.
Apart from legal provisions, the degree of real freedom which a central bank enjoys will
be affected by changes in government, key personalities in the central bank and in
government, the integrity of its top officials, the quality and credibility of its reports and
analyses of issues, and its success in building and sustaining a low-inflation political
constituency over time. Also important are how the central bank has used its multifaceted
relations with the banks and other financial institutions by developing harmonious
relationship based on co-operation and persuasion rather than coercion rooted in the
exercise of statutory powers, good relations with the print and electronic media. Finally, its
relations with foreign central banks, correspondent banks, and international monetary and
financial institutions, like the IMF and the World Bank.
There is also the human challenge. The success of a central bank depends ultimately
on the quality and motivation of its staff. In recent years according to Walsh, "innovation
in commercial banking in terms of engineering and marketing of new financial products
has relegated the role of central banker to that of observer, learned, and perhaps worried
supervisor; the central banker is rarely at the forefront of developments - normally a step
or two bebind." 23 This is a serious but legitimate observation that needs to be properly
addressed as central banks enter the 21st century, by regularly upgrading staff skills and
expertise, and by seeking to have central bank managers identify with the banking and the
commercial world and not to be over-identified as part of a bureaucracy that appears to be
at odds with the private sector ethos of the banks.
Regarding the management of external reserves, where this is the responsibility of the
central bank, liquidity and security should continue to have priority. The guiding rules here
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relate inter alia to the choice of currencies, the adherence to target ranges for the
proportionate mix of currencies, the choice of investments, and observance of limits on
certain instruments and maturities.
Finally, is the challenge of cultivating a capacity for regular critical appraisal of what
the central bank does, why and how well they are done, with a view to improving on its
effectiveness and appreciating proposals for change from other quarters. Such reviews
could be in-house to start with, but should be carried out by a pane] of experts constituted
by the Central Bank itself as the IMF and the World Bank are already doing.

VII. THE MILLENNIUM BUG
For quite some time past, there have been warnings of problems that are likely to arise
on January 1, 2000 when computers around the world may erroneously read the new year
in the standard two-digit year field as 1900. This could cause substantial disruption in
financial transactions including transformation of payments schedules. Initially, the
millennium bug (Y2K) was widely viewed as an information technology problem. Now it
is recognized as a management and business problem, solution to which involves
evaluating and managing risk, perception and behaviour. The key to the problem is
understanding its nature, and developing contingency plans to work around it.
Many countries did not start early enough to address the Y2K problem. It was
reported that as at April, 1999, more than 30 countries were yet to address it; "93% of
computer companies and governments could not determine when their systems would fail;
81 % of aJI commercial software was not Y2K compliant."24 However, the general opinion
as at that time was that the banking and financial systems, both nationally and
internationally, were in good shape.
Reasons attributed for the late start in addressing the problem included inadequate
level of awareness; the adoption of a high-strategy of "wait and see" as the most costeffective strategy; resource constraint which made some countries accord low priority to
Y2k problem, and the level of computerization - countries that do not rely heavily on
large mainframe computer system initially ignored the spectre of the Y2K.25
The time left for action is now short, but this should not rule out actions that can
ameliorate the envisaged problems. To that end, central banks should, first of all set their
houses in order by examining their own level of readiness for the year 2000. They should
identify their mission-critical systems, fix those they have time to fix and develop plans to
work around those they do not have time to fix . If they have not, they should formulate
plans to ensure year 2000 compliance by the banking and other financial institutions,
monitor achievements and problems with a view to assisting them, and instilling
confidence in the public. In anticipation of the Y2K problem, people could worry about
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credit which might result in a 'flight to quality' as investors and depositors move their
assets to safer havens.
Y2K is a systematic problem and should, as such, be addressed properly to avoid a
systematic crisis. Thus, the situation in high-impact countries with the strongest links to the
international financial system should be given priority attention by their central banks.
Contingency plans to maintain critical functions should be put in place. On the whole the
watchword should be as Yardeni puts it, "prepare for the worst, hope for the best."26

VIll. CONCLUSION
The paper, apart from a short historical background, dealt in varying depths, with the
challenges currently facing central banks and most of which will no doubt be carried over
into the 21st century in the context of price stability, the stability and soundness of the
financial and payment system, exchange rate stability and the management of central
banks, operations. The Y2K problem as relates to the banking and financial system though
critical, is peripheral and as the IMF report indicates, is reasonably being addressed.
If the criterion of success of a business or an organization is that it should reproduce
and multiply over time, the finding is that central banks have been successful. Their
number has multiplied and continues to rise as more countries attain political
independence. However, when considered in the context of the impact of their actions and
policies and taking cognizance of their mandates, the result is mixed. While some of them
have succeeded to rein in inflation and achieved a high degree of stability in the finai:icia1
system and exchange rates for most of the time, episodes of endemic inflation
characterized the economies of the others. Exchange rates are far from being stable in
many countries, while the financial system continues to witness distress and failures of
financial institutions.
Thus far, current opinion attributes more of the blame for the failure to government
interference. With the wind of change blowing across central banks resulting in their
autonomy, central banks will, in the course of the 21st century, be put on the spot. Should
they fail, despite being given both the mandate and the operational autonomy, they will
once again, have to contend with a renewal of exotic proposals such as that of free banking
which envisages the removal of central banking altogether.
Added to this is the spectre of regional economic and monetary integration and the
consequences for central banking. As pointed out in the text, the replication of the
European experience which produced the European Central Bank and the European
currency (Euro), may reverse the tidal wave of central bank autonomy. On this crucial
issue, Karl-Otto Pohl, President of the German Bundesbank, observed that "by definition,
it would mean the end of the independence of the Bundesbank as a monetary policy agent.
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The President of the Bundesbank would just be a member of a council and have one vote
among others"27 This is food for thought when considering challenges facing central banks
in the next millennium.
Financial innovation, rapid developments m information systems and
communications technology, and globalization which have all, singly or jointly, played a
role in determining the challenges confronting central banks, will gather even greater
momentum in the years ahead. Since no central bank can afford to be left behind, they just
have to learn to live with the evolving situation and take due cognizance of it in their
decision-making process. Problems have to be anticipated and contingency measures
formulated to ensure instantaneous action in the even of crisis which may provide little or
no advance warnings.
Without repeating what has been said in the text, it is apt to say that the challenges to
central banks in the years to come will continue to centre mainly on their primary functions
as succinctly put by John Major, former British Prime Minister, as the "defence of the
currency, defence of the nation's credit, and defence of their own position in the political
fi.rmarnent."28 In addition, central banks should continue to put emphasis on: modem
analysis to explain old thoughts or ideas, the relevance of expectations and importance of
credibility to the success of policy, and the crucial importance of co-operation with their
counterparts abroad, especially in times of crises.
More importantly, central banks should always bear in mind what Paul Volcker, once
described as the lasting qualities which are the hallmarks of central banking"
"Continuity and all that implies for experience and nurturing
a long view; competence and all that implies for a high
degree of professionalism and careful deliberations and
communication; and integrity and all that implies for
accountability, transparency and simple honesty."29
These are the qualities that determined central banks 'current influence in the political
process and public respect for them, their credibility and success in achieving stability at
home and constructive co-operation with their counterparts abroad.
Finally, by virtue of its objectives, central banks have become a unique place for their
staff. They are unique to the extent to which practical and theoretical knowledge come
together, interact and get blended. This has to continue to ensure that the most rigorous
intellectual standards, not only in relation to the theoretical underpinning of issues, but also
in relation to the expanding professional knowledge are maintained in the practical
execution of policies. It is this duality that has been most attractive and stimulating to staff,
which in the last analysis, makes a central bank.

E. A. Ajayi
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